1 .
Introduction
In this paper we are interested in the lower hemi-continuity of the Nash equilibrium correspondence with respect to the number of players.
Specifically, given an equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players, and a finite player game that approximates the continuum game, is there an equilibrium of the finite player game that is "close" to the equilibrium of the continuum game?
We show that lower hemi-continuity obtains if the players' payoffs are differentiable , strictly concave in their own actions, and moreover have the property that the indirect effect that players have on each other is small in the appropriate sense. This bound on the cross -player effects, when carefully specified, implies that the operator representing the cross partial derivatives of players payoffs with respect to each other's actions is compact.
It implies also that the continuum game cannot exhibit a robust indeterminacy, and is connected to similar conditions used to establish determinacy in continuum economies in Kehoe , Levine , Mas-Colell and Zame [1986] , and Kehoe, Levine and Romer [1987] , A similar condition is used by Araujo and Scheinkman [1977] in studying the value function in dynamic programming.
The upper hemi-continuity of the Nash correspondence has been studied extensively by Green [1984] , and by Fudenberg and Levine [1986] .
Our [1986] paper studied lower-hemicontinuity as well, but it considered e -equilibria, providing conditions for an exact equilibrium of a given game to be an eequilibrium of games that are nearby. However, the literature on limits of monopolistically competitive equilibrium, including the papers of Green [1980] , Mas-Colell [1982] , Novshek and Sonnenschein [1980] , and Roberts [1980] , have examined lower-hemi-continuity of exact "equilibria. These results depend heavily on there being a fixed finite number of types (although not all of the above papers impose strict concavity in own action n n n n n
In other words, we will provide conditions for the Nash equilibrium correspondence to be lower hemi-continuous in the continuum of players limit.
3 .
An Implicit Function Theorem
Suppose that instead of the discrete parameter n and separate spaces Ia"
This is an implication of the contraction mapping fixed point theorem.
Observe that Ax + rj(x) -if and only if x --A r?(x).
Obviously U is a complete metric space; we must show that -A rj is a contraction of U.
First we show that -A r) maps U into U. This follows from the sequence of inequalities
(We obtain the last inequality by substituting the bounds on |x-x| and
This shows that x exists and is unique.
It remains to estimate |x-x| 
follows from (3.1) 1 n n n n n nnn 11 ' and the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. To see this, write 0.5)
From (3.1), and |x-x|, |x'-x| < b, it follows that
4.
Convergence of Operators
We wish to apply the inverse function theorem to conclude that a Nash 
This contradiction establishes the Lemma. Q.E.D. Now we provide conditions on D4 (x) that permit us to appeal to n Proposition 4.2. Recall that in the payoff function 7r P (a,x), player p's own action affects his payoff both directly and through its "indirect effect" on the vector x. We have already assumed that »r [a,x] , which J n incorporates the indirect effects into the first argument, is concave in x.
We will now also assume that the direct effects themselves are concave: Under these assumptions we can use Proposition 4.2 to show that the Nash correspondence is lower hemi-continuous at the continuum of players and h is the linear functional defined by hx -J"h(q)x(q)dq.
Then D(f> =B +E +C,Diji>-B + C. Clearly B -B, and since B n n n n n n is strictly negative definite, Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Next observe that D<ji(x) -B -ch has rank one, and is thus compact. 
